Some Observations by Bolitho, Harold




Each of the papers in this panel touches on issues which individually are significant enough to warrant
more leisurely consideration. We have Professor Funya on the subject of the relations between a daimyo and his
retainers, a complex topic in which nothing is ever quite as it seems. There is Professor Roli on the virtually
untouched theme of daimyo relations with their peers. Professor Morris directs our attention to the persistence of
landed fiefs, a subject consigned to obscmity for a generation. and Professor Sippel moves well beyond the standard
superficialities to look and the far from one-sided interaction between villagers and those who taxed them. Every
one of these issues is of the ~test imponance in detemliDing ~sely how Tokugawa Japan works. Perhaps one
of these days. when more ~ing matters of gender and sexuality have been resolved, we might see them receiving
the notice d)Cy deserve.
For convenience I am dividing the four papers into two groups, an easy enough exercise, since Professor
Funya and Rori, dealing as they do with d)C daimyo class, and specifically with tow successive daimyo of Bizen,
make a natural coupling, as do Professor Morris and Sippel. each of whom is concerned with the land-those who
claimed authority over it, and those who wcrked iL The panel is in fact very nicely balanced between superstructure
and substrUCture. I shall comment on each group first and then launch headlong into some observations.
Immediately after reading the Funya and Ron papers I grabbed for my copy of Dokai kOshUki. This, as
many will know, is a work consisting of confidential appraisals of the state of ~h daimyo domain around the year
1690. The Bakufu commissioned them, and the officials it charged with the task of compiling them were most
certainly not afraid to be critical where they thought criticism to be due.
So what do these repons have to tell us about the Bizen domain just eight years after the retired Mitsumasa' s
death, and some eighteen years after Tsunamasa had replaced him as daimyo. It's rather interesting, so I'll quote a
couple of passages.
The habits of the samurai are orderly, and many cultivate both the literary and military arts. However this is
not due to the present daimyo, Iyo no kami. It is due to the legacy of his father, Shintar? MitsulnaSa. who
was unmatched in the practise of letters and military matters and possessed of an abundance of fine
qualities. Because the policies of Mitsumasa's time as they relate to government have not been altered. the
people are happy and prosperous.
So that's the Bakufu's secret assessment of Ikeda Mitsumasa. who emerges from it sounding suspiciously
like the meikJm Professor Fukaya claims be wasn'L
Mitsumasa's son, Tsunamasa. who is die subject of Professor Hori's presentation, does Dot fare nearly so
well under Bakufu scrutiny. Here is what Dokai kOshUAi says of him:
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Tsunamasa is stupid by nature, and lacks discrimination. His father Mitsumasa was famous throughout the
realm as a master of the literary and martial arts. The son is ignorant and illiterate. Although be owns a
mountain of books relating to Confucianism and military affairs, be bas not looked at any of them. In
consequence be is obtuse and ill-bebaved. He devotes himself day and night to drinking parties and
disreputable behavior, neglecting the way of government.
In the context of Professor Hori's paper, therefore, we can certainly see why the Bakufu might have
preferred his distant cousin over in Tottori, and why he might have been reluctant to give Tsunamasa the court rank
he wanted-at least without some money changing hands. Professor Hori' s paper skirts around this latter possibility
quite delicately, but since it also refers to the daimyo of Sendai and Satsuma having "consumed themselves" in the
mid-eightecnth century trying to have their status raised, it's not a completely impossible scenario.
Nevertheless, if the passages I've just quoted from Dokai kOshaki lend credence to the substance of
Professor Hori's paper, they do raise some questions about the meikun issue presented to us by Professor Fukaya. I
should say at this juncture that I find Professor Fukaya's argument entirely plausible an~xcept for the problem
raised by the Bakufu' s secret repon-entirely convincing. Bering in mind the kinds of tensions that always existed
between and daimyo and his vassals, it makes sense that the latter should try to control the former-unobtrusively if
possible, but in any case control was an issue from which retainers simply could not afford to back away. Far too
much was at stake.
So what more natural than that they should fabricate the picture of a model ruler, and use that as yet another
instrument in their perennial attempt to keep their daimyo under restraint? Mitsumasa' s vassals, the minute he was
dead, started to create an image of their late lord not as be was, but as they would have wished him to be, and the
way in which they hoped that his successors might be. Where the real Mitsumasa was suspected by the Bakufu,
resented by his retainers, and disliked by his people, the phony one was universally loved, and for just the right set
of qualities.
All of this makes sense to me but, as I said, it docs leave us with the Dolai kOshaki testimony to explain
away. We know the Bakufu had its doubts about Mitsumasa, so, in the context of a secret report. why should its
inspectors have pulled any punches? If they could say that the living Tsunamasa was stupid and illiterate, why could
they not say that the dead Mitsumasa was untrustworthy, authoritarian and greedy? Instead, at the very moment that
the Bizen vassals are inventing their meikun image, the Bakufu seems content to accept it too. As the King of Siam
once said on Broadway, '1t is a puzzlement." I certainly don't have the answer, but it's certainly a query that needs
to be raised. Perhaps Mitsumasa really was a meikun.
With the papers from John Morris and Patricia Sippel (both of whom, incidentally, I am proud to claim as
my feUow-countrypcrson&-and perhaps it is here that I should express my gratitude to Phil Brown for acting as the
panel's token American) we are brought very much closer to the land. There can be no doubt that both papers have
got it right-in John's case, that the significance of jikara chigyo have been minimiZed all too often, and the
hatamoto left out, in the general stampede to construct a picture of a Japan in which samurai aU live in castle towns
and draw salaries.. In this, as in so much else in Tokugawa Japan, where experience varied wildly from place to
place, we can reaDy take nothing for granted. It is an interesting topic and, I suspect, an extremely complicated one.
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Patricia Sipple's paper, too, is absolutely convincing. It's all very well to make diagrams of Tokugawa
Japan's power structure showing d1e shogun at the top, followed by the daimyo, followed by the samurai, followed
by everybody else, especially the farmers, with everybody able to push around everyone beneath them, but we all
know that's a caricature. Villagers were not powerless, not nearly so powerless as the wording of Bakufu and han
laws suggests. Their negotiating position was, if not one of equality, then certainly not far from it-the power
structure, after all, needed them rather more than d1ey needed d1e power structure. As Patricia says of the villagers of
Nishi-Takahashi and Nishi-Mizunuma, "It was, after all, their community." They could comply when it seemed
appropriate, and resist when it seemed appropriate. Taken in conjunction with John's paper, it made me wonder
what on earth would have happened if the hare-brained scheme proposed by every ideologue from Ogyii Sorai to
lkuta Yorozu had been put into practice. If the samurai had been forced out into the countryside, and the doctrinaire
position demanded, and made to work their fiefs as farmers, how would existing fief-holders have coped with the
influx and, more importantly, how would the villagers? If the Shimotsuke villagers were uncooperative about
bringing in a few farmers from elsewhere, imagine how they would have reacted to a mass invasion of soft-handed
samurai.
Now Professor Fukaya has warned us against going down the blind alley represented by the debate over a
centralized or decentralized Tokugawa Japan. On the whole 'I tend to agree with him, because it seems to me that the
debate, such as it is, is not so much about the actual phenomena involved as it is about interpretations, and
interpretations, as we know, can be influenced by many extraneous elements, among them temperament, perspective
and opportunity. How are we to describe the bakuhan raisei - is it incomplete central government or limited
regionalism? Should we deplore a failure to proceed to total national integration, or applaud the resolute survival of
regional independence? Is the glass of the bakuhan raisei lamentably half-empty or heroically half-full? Pessimists
might say the former, optimists the latter. Observe the glass from the top down and it appears half empty; from the
bottom up, it seems half full. Neither position is totally right, and neither totally wrong, and in any case, both are
oversimplifications. Two hundred and sixty-some years is a long time, and naturally there were fluctuations in the
water level, both from time to time, and from place to place. Sometimes the level inched up a little, as it did under
Tsunayoshi, for example, and sometimes it went down. It was certainly not static and, like just about everything else
in Tokugawa Japan, was subject to enormous regional variation, so that, for example, the level in Fukuyama was
always much lower than in Satsuma.
But what is certain, as these papers all demonstrate, is that each side of the bakuhan raisei - the baku on
one hand and the han on the other - had an essential role to play in the Tokugawa order. Take the status question
which Professor Hori has presented to ~. I quite understand that Tsunamasa was angling for higher court rank not
from any wish to strengthen his links with Edo, but rather to re-establish his status vis-a-vis Tottori, and by
implication with all the other daimyo as well. That's a good point. But to get that status he had to turn to the Bakufu
- there was just nowhere else to go.
Then, too, if you look up the Ikeda in Dokai kOshaki you don't fmd them under that name. Instead they are
the Matsudaira of Bizen, a family name granted to them by the Tokugawa, just as the Mitsu of Mitsumasa and the
Tsuna of Tsunarnasa were granted by the shoguns of the time. Presumably accepting these marks of Tokugawa
esteem (not that they could readily be refused) was symbolic of something. .
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Equally symbolic was the elaborate ceremonial netWork centered around the shogun. I didn't have time to
check the Bizen situation, but the experience of successive daimyo of Utsunomiya was probably not too different in
kind. if more modest in scale. Traditionally, on his accession the daimyo of Utsunomiya gave the shogun a sword,
thirty pieces of gold, five rolls of crepe, a horse and a saddle. Twice a year he gave gifts of silver. Each new Year,
on the occasion of the first Noh performance, he gave the shogun a wooden tray and some gold in lieu of sake; in
early spring he gave him a box of mushrooms; in early summer a box of dried rice; in midsummer a box of noodles;
in early autumn a box of salt fish; in winter a box of sweet potatoes. "So what?" you might say. Big deal. But these
gifts of mountains, uplands, paddies and sea were all symbolic of the subordination of one to the other. Symbolic,
yes, but we can't discount symbols any more. Rimalistic, yes, but we can't discount ritual, either. Maybe-gasp!-the
names and gifts were actual stage props in a theater of authority and submission. Whatever they were, they clearly
had some meaning.
Then there were the Bakufu's practical powers - over foreign relations, foreign trade, adjudication of
disputes, sankin total, disenfeoffments, fief transfers, and forced labor. These were not negligible, even if not used
to the fullesL Nor, it must be said, were those powers wielded entirely at daimyo expense. The fact is that daimyo
during the Tokugawa period were safer than they had ever been, simply because of the monopoly of power the
James White has pointed to. They did not have to worry about each other (except in status terms, as Professor Bori
indicates), and they did not have to worry about being overthrown by their vassals; in oie sOdO the Bakufu almost
invariably supported the daimyo and punished the vassals. In the Tokugawa period it was possible to become a
daimyo at the age of two and go untouched through a normal life span. This was certainly not the case in earlier
periods of Japanese history.
On the other hand, beyond these kinds of powers the Bakufu was not a government which had a great
impact on the rest of Japan. The domains were substantially able to do as they wished in a number of area5-tax
policies, trade policies, samurai numbers, law and order, to name afew. For most Japanese the central government
as such hardly existed, represented only by posted proclamations. There was absolutely none of the paraphernalia of
central governments elsewhere--no public statues, no heads on coins, no triumphal arches, no grand boulevards,
nothing to impress on the general populace any sense of who the shogun might be, or what he might look like.
Instead he was sheltered from public gaze by castle walls and palanquin lattices, and his government was no less
secretive and remote. All the ofuregaki to the contrary, his government interfered as little as possible in everyday
life. The number of things it simply could not do is legion. It couldn't enforce a ban on tobacco growing, it couldn't
control prices, it couldn't control consumers, it couldn't restrict travel, it couldn't prevent the alienation of land, it
couldn't close down the pornography industry, and on, and on, and on.
So it doesn't matter much how we characterize the level of water in the glass, so long as we recognize what
the outlines were. If we're clear on those, then we can allow each other some latitude. We can even call it a
compound state, if you think that sounds any better, as long as it does not imply stasis, and as long as it does not
overlook the fact that there was a more or less constant tug-of-war going on at every level--centrifugal against
centripetal, shogun against daimyo, daimyo against retainers, farmers against officials-all of them with legitimate
interests to push. And it was not a system that sprang from any conscious design, from the brow of leyasu or lemitsu
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or anybody else. Intimately, like all human endeavour, it was produced by a combination of many tlrings-accident,
ambition, compromise, fear, inertia and habit
Inertia in particular hardly ever receives the recognition it deserves, but its importance in Tokugawa Japan
is undeniable. It lay at the bottom of all the criticism leveled at the system by Confucian ideologues. With few, if
any, exceptions, they disparaged the system of government, not because it was too repressive, but because it was not
repressive enough. Because it was too indulgent, went the usual refrain, the samurai became flabby, the merchants
arrogant, and the peasants revolting. No doubt all this was true, and the critics were right to draw attention to it, but
they were not right to see it as a shortcoming. Because in so many ways the system of government was unorganized,
haphazard in practice, if not in theory, lacking in discipline, and at best reactive rather than proactive, it allowed the
development of what I suspect was one of the world's less disagreeable societies. We, with our different expectations,
would certainly not have cared for it ourselves, but that is not really the point
